On 21 February 2025, the UK Competition Appeal Tribunal (CAT) unanimously dismissed Stellantis's claim for €770 million in damages against Autoliv, a leading global manufacturer of automotive occupant safety systems ("OSS"), and others: Stellantis Auto SAS and others v Autoliv AB and others [2025] CAT 9. White & Case LLP acted for Autoliv.
Stellantis's claim was alleged to arise from anti-competitive conduct in the market for OSS, in particular seatbelts, airbags and steering wheels, in the period 2002-2011. All of the defendants, with the exception of Autoliv, settled with Stellantis prior to the conclusion of the trial in October 2024.
The Stellantis claimants comprised the Peugeot (PSA), Fiat Chrysler (FCA), and Vauxhall/Opel (VO) automotive original equipment manufacturers ("OEMs"). These OEMs now form part of the Stellantis group but were all separate businesses during the relevant period.
The Claim
Stellantis's claim was not a typical follow-on claim, which relies on the findings of the European Commission or the CMA to establish the liability of the defendants. Nonetheless, the starting point for Stellantis's complaint was the Commission's OSS1 and OSS2 Decisions which found discrete infringements of competition law in the market for OSS in relation to the supply of components to identified OEMs in the period 2004-2011. Notably, the Stellantis claimants were not among the identified OEMs.
As a result, Stellantis pursued a rare "standalone" cartel claim, alleging either a market-wide cartel or distinct cartels targeting the Stellantis companies in operation between 2002 and 2011. The European Commission had not found such infringements (nor had any other competition regulator) despite its extensive multi-year investigations into the OSS market supported by multiple leniency applications. Stellantis claimed to have suffered "overcharges" on OSS components supplied by Autoliv to the Stellantis OEMs of between 10% and 26% on average across all supplies agreed in the period 2002-2011.
Stellantis also ran a novel "indirect effects" or "spillover" claim, alleging that Autoliv's participation in the OSS1 and OSS2 infringements relating to other OEMs led to the Stellantis OEMs paying supra-competitive prices for their OSS components (at the same level of overcharge as alleged in Stellantis's primary case). For this alternative claim, Stellantis relied on the liability established by the Commission's OSS Decisions.
The Tribunal's Judgment
At trial, drawing on previous authorities, Autoliv submitted that the seriousness of the standalone cartel allegations required "strong and compelling" evidence to satisfy Stellantis's burden of proof. The Tribunal declined to apply this requirement to the Claimants, considering it effectively an alternative higher standard to the balance of probabilities, which is difficult to reconcile with the courts' recognition that the nature of cartel cases means that evidence is likely to be fragmentary. However, it was unequivocal that "this does not mean that the case does not have to be proven" and that "before drawing inferences, the Court must be careful to ensure there are not equally plausible alternative explanations".1
In its judgment, the Tribunal found, on the balance of probabilities (without requiring "strong and compelling" evidence) that there had been limited instances of anti-competitive contacts relating to the Stellantis OEMs, but it could not conclude that this activity was "more than sporadic, or that it extended over the entire Cartel Period, or that it was effective and resulted in an overcharge".2
As for the alternative "indirect effects" claim, the Tribunal found that evidence for so-called "spillover" effects never developed beyond a "theoretical speculation".3 Moreover, the Tribunal found that there was no evidence of overcharge to the OEMs that were named in the OSS1 and OSS2 decisions, so how could there be a "spillover" effect on the Stellantis OEMs?
The Econometric Evidence
In reaching its conclusions on Stellantis's case, the Tribunal carefully examined – and ultimately rejected entirely – the econometric expert evidence put forward by Stellantis.
Stellantis had relied on its expert evidence both to evidence the existence of the alleged cartel (through the higher prices observed during the relevant period) as well as to quantify the alleged damages it claimed. The Tribunal rejected in principle the notion that an econometric model could of itself lead to a conclusion that there was a cartel. The Tribunal was also critical of the assessment of the documentary evidence undertaken by the Claimants' expert to conclude that the cartel alleged by Stellantis was in operation. This it viewed as a "trespass" on matters to be resolved by the Tribunal, albeit "a fault in the way in which Stellantis's case was structured", rather than a criticism of the expert.4
At trial, Autoliv's expert demonstrated the fragility of Stellantis's economic model to "sensitivity testing", i.e. testing the robustness of the model to reasonable changes in its assumptions. The results of that testing led the Tribunal to conclude that the model was "so unreliable in its outputs that it is unusable".5
Aside from the shortcomings in Stellantis's econometric model, the Tribunal also appeared to find the magnitude of overcharges claimed to be divorced from the economic reality. In particular, the Tribunal noted that the Stellantis OEMs were experienced and sophisticated purchasers with countervailing buyer power, making it unlikely that overcharges in excess of 10% and up to 26% could be achieved without Stellantis taking issue.
Limits of the "broad axe"
The Claimants' approach to quantifying their alleged losses also met the limits of the "broad axe". The broad axe gives the Claimants and Tribunal some degree of latitude where quantification of damages is imprecise. Stellantis had modelled overcharge for the PSA Claimants only using data from PSA, and none of the other Claimant groups. Stellantis then sought to apply the PSA overcharge estimates to claim damages for FCA and VO (which were entirely separate businesses during the relevant period) relying on the "broad axe". However, the Tribunal found that reliance a step too far, stating that "to measure losses in one business and transpose them to another unconnected business, is not a measure of damage: there comes a point at which the broad axe becomes a mallet".6
Key takeaways
As one of very few private damages actions in the UK to proceed through trial to judgment, the Tribunal's judgment in Stellantis will have implications for claimants, defendants and experts in other cartel cases.
Claimants advancing standalone cartel allegations may be encouraged by the fact that the Tribunal did not require "strong and compelling" evidence of the alleged infringement. On the other hand, defendants will be encouraged that a cartel inference should not be drawn where equally plausible interpretations of documents evidencing legitimate contacts are available.
Stellantis also further underscores the limits of econometric evidence. It cannot of itself make good cartel allegations to establish liability and experts should be careful not to trespass on disputed issues of fact for the Tribunal's determination. The judgment is also clear that experts should be transparent in their approach and not tailor it to achieve a desired outcome. More generally, the Tribunal has indicated that econometric analyses ought not to be considered in a vacuum. For sophisticated purchasers with countervailing buyer power, the Tribunal is likely to expect to see some evidence that overcharges of high magnitudes exceeded expectations, or otherwise an explanation as to how such overcharges could have evaded detection.
The English courts have been a popular forum for competition private damages claims, but the overwhelming majority brought to date have ended in settlements. Stellantis shows that, where a claim is pursued to trial, the courts will rigorously scrutinise its merits. In future, this may well serve to discourage claimants from pursuing more speculative claims and, conversely, give defendants the reassurance needed to defend flawed claims all the way to trial, if necessary.
1 Stellantis Judgment, 34.
2 Stellantis Judgment, 152.
3 Stellantis Judgment, 240.
4 Stellantis Judgment, 159.
5 Stellantis Judgment, 214.
6 Stellantis Judgment, 231.
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