European Commission Publishes ‘DSA Elections Toolkit’ to Support Digital Services Coordinators’ Role in Elections Integrity

Last month, the European Commission (the "Commission"), in collaboration with the European Board for Digital Services (the "Board"), published the DSA Elections Toolkit for Digital Services Coordinators: Instruments, Best Practices, and Lessons Learnt (the "Elections Toolkit").¹ The Elections Toolkit is designed as a resource for Member States' Digital Services Coordinators (DSCs), to guide their efforts to protect the integrity of electoral processes in the EU and promote a safe and transparent online environment for EU citizens to participate in democratic processes. It is part of a broader effort under the EU Digital Services Act² (the "DSA") to develop expertise and capabilities on systemic and emerging risks across the EU.

Below, we explore how the Elections Toolkit:

• Evidences the Commission's support for DSCs undertaking elections-related regulatory activities at a national level, even though, under the DSA, powers to supervise and enforce the relevant DSA obligations are exclusively reserved to the Commission";
• Outlines non-exhaustive, optional, customisable, and scalable methods and actions that DSCs can take to help safeguard elections and improve the effectiveness of mitigation measures taken by very large online platforms and very large online search engines ("VLOPs" and "VLOSEs" respectively);³ and,
• Highlights four key areas where DSCs can contribute to elections integrity: (1) stakeholder management; (2) communication and media literacy; (3) monitoring and analysis of election-related risks; and (4) incident response—and suggests specific 'tools' and activities that DSCs can implement in each of these areas

Background: DSCs' role under the DSA in the context of elections

Articles 34-35 DSA require VLOPs and VLOSEs to identify, assess and mitigate systemic risks in the EU stemming from the design, functioning or use of their services. These include any actual or foreseeable negative effects on civic discourse and electoral processes. Articles 34-35 DSA are the main DSA provisions that give regulators supervisory and enforcement powers over VLOPs' and VLOSEs' activities with respect to electoral processes.

Under the DSA,⁴ each Member State's DSC is responsible for supervising and enforcing the DSA in its respective Member State. DSCs are also required to contribute to the effective and consistent supervision and enforcement of the DSA throughout the EU. However, the Commission is exclusively responsible for supervising and enforcing certain DSA provisions that apply only to VLOPs and VLOSEs (i.e., those in Section 5 of Chapter III, including Articles 34-35 DSA) and can also enforce all other DSA obligations against VLOPs and VLOSEs.

In practice, tensions have emerged between DSCs' (and seemingly the Commission's) desire for DSCs to be involved in supervising VLOPs' and VLOSEs' elections-related activities at a national level, and the fact that the relevant powers under Articles 34-35 DSA fall within the exclusive competence of the Commission.

It appears that one intention behind the Elections Toolkit is to help resolve such tensions. As a joint publication between the Board⁵ (which is composed primarily of representatives of the DSCs) and the Commission, the Elections Toolkit indicates that, notwithstanding the Commission's exclusive formal jurisdiction with respect to Articles 34-35 DSA, DSCs have the Commission's support in undertaking elections-related regulatory activities at a national level. For example, the Elections Toolkit explains that:

• DSCs have become "increasingly involved in election-related activities, both as part of the regulatory dialogue with VLOPs and VLOSEs and as part of election networks, discussions, and events in their Member States and at the EU level";
• although "[e]nsuring compliance with obligations to mitigate systemic risks for electoral processes is the exclusive competence of the Commission" and "the role of DSCs is not to enforce these obligations", nevertheless "DSCs play an important role in sharing relevant information, developing knowledge and supporting cooperation between stakeholders at a national level"; and,
• given that DSCs' role is expected to "continue to develop in the future", the Board "therefore believes that it is essential to communicate about the [DSCs'] involvement in mitigating systemic risks in the electoral process under the DSA in a way that fosters trust among voters and key stakeholders".

Emerging best practices: DSC tools and activities for promoting election integrity

The Elections Toolkit builds on the DSA Election Guidelines published by the Commission in April 2024, and incorporates insights from the implementation of the Code of Practice on Disinformation (the "COPD").

However, unlike the Election Guidelines (which are official guidance from the Commission) and the COPD (which is due to be officially integrated into the DSA's framework),⁶ the Elections Toolkit emphasises that it "should not be considered as representing the official position of the [Commission]". Rather, the Elections Toolkit is intended only as a "non-exhaustive, optional, customisable and scalable menu of possible actions" that DSCs "can" take with respect to elections. It provides examples of customisable activities that DSCs may choose to take according to their available resources and jurisdiction-specific political and social dynamics.

The Elections Toolkit highlights four key areas where DSCs can contribute to elections integrity: (1) stakeholder management; (2) communication and media literacy; (3) monitoring and analysis of election-related risks; and (4) incident response. In each of these areas, it suggests specific 'tools' and activities that DSCs can implement within the election cycle, and when. These four key areas are summarised below.

1. Stakeholder management

To build and maintain relationships with stakeholders and share knowledge and resources, the Elections Toolkit recommends that DSCs consider undertaking the following activities:

• Establishing connections with stakeholders: Identify, and build and maintain relationships with, key stakeholders—including state election bodies, relevant VLOPs, VLOSEs and other online services, election campaign teams and political parties, researchers, and civil society organisations.
• Engaging VLOPs and VLOSEs: Once elections are announced, provide relevant platforms with key information about the elections, such as key timings and applicable rules. This allows DSCs to highlight potential challenges of the electoral campaign in advance and discuss how gaps in the performance of specific mitigation measures in the local context can be addressed.
• Organising pre-election roundtables: Facilitate engagement and discussion between regulators and relevant stakeholders—in particular providers of VLOPs and VLOSEs—about how to address specific areas of concern, gain better understanding of the national context, and allow for discussion and observations from authorities and experts in fields such as media literacy, cybersecurity or disinformation. Roundtables can be used by DSCs to increase oversight, transparency and accountability of platform providers.

2. Communication and media literacy

To engage with the public or specific audiences to inform, educate and build trust, the Elections Toolkit suggests that DSCs consider carrying out the following activities:

• Facilitating the publication of information for voters: Facilitate contact and information exchange between VLOPs/VLOSEs and competent authorities to ensure voters have access to accurate and reliable election information, and to prevent the spread of disinformation.
• Publishing DSA-specific guidance and information for candidates: Engage directly with election candidates to provide relevant DSA-related information concerning the election campaign (e.g., about VLOPs', VLOSEs' and advertisers' respective responsibilities); and create information packs for candidates, explaining how to, e.g., use online platforms' DSA-mandated mechanisms for reporting illegal content.
• Promoting media literacy campaigns: Promote campaigns to empower voters to critically evaluate online information, understand the influence of VLOPs and VLOSEs on public discourse, and make more informed decisions. DSCs should specifically consider the local context to help build resilience against manipulation techniques to which voters may be subject online.

3. Monitoring and analysis of election-related risks

To facilitate public scrutiny and assessment of the performance of VLOPs' and VLOSEs' mitigation measures, the Elections Toolkit encourages DSCs to consider undertaking the following activities:

• Facilitating research and data access possibilities: Encourage a broad range of stakeholders to use the 'transparency tools' provided by the DSA. For example, DSCs can inform the research community about data access opportunities under Article 40 DSA, which allows '"vetted researchers", among others, to study systemic risks including potential negative impacts on civic discourse and electoral processes, and assess the effectiveness of risk mitigation measures adopted by VLOPs and VLOSEs in those areas.
• Facilitating monitoring of political advertising and performance of ad libraries during electoral campaigns: Promote efforts to monitor distribution of political ads on online platforms (e.g., using advertising repositories established by online services under the DSA and the Transparency and Targeting of Political Advertising Regulation ) and help identify which ads are liable and designed to influence election outcomes, voting behaviour or legislative and regulatory processes.
• Lessons learnt and post-elections reporting: Issue post-election reports detailing actions taken and lessons learnt, and discuss findings with national authorities at both Member State and EU levels.

4. Incident response

To prepare for, react to, and aid in the resolution of critical issues as they occur, the Elections Toolkit recommends that DSCs consider implementing the following activities:

• Establishing incident protocols and networks: Establish protocols and procedures for rapid response to unforeseen developments, such as monitoring the operation of the COPD's Rapid Response System, which allows non-platform COPD signatories to report to VLOP/VLOSE signatories any time-sensitive content that potentially threatens the integrity of electoral processes.
• Facilitating onboarding to key escalation channels: Help ensure an effective response to potential crises by establishing escalation channels with relevant partners, including other state institutions, and VLOPs and VLOSEs.
• Organising tabletop exercises/stress tests: Conduct a tabletop exercise just before an election to stress test and ensure proper functioning of incident protocols, escalation channels and overall cooperation between key stakeholders.
• Responding to complaints: Establish protocols and guidelines for managing complaints before, during and after elections, especially if there is an increase in volume or a change in the nature of complaints in this period.

While the Elections Toolkit's examples of best practices may help DSCs to promote the integrity of electoral processes in the EU online and offline, it also provides "further transparency" to other stakeholders about the increasingly proactive and interventionist role that DSCs seem likely to take in the context of national elections.

Burak Haylamaz (White & Case, Staff Attorney, Los Angeles) contributed to the development of this publication.

_{1 "DSA Election Toolkit for Digital Services Coordinators: Instruments, Best Practices, and Lessons Learnt", available here. 
2 Regulation (EU) 2022/2065 on a Single Market for Digital Services (Digital Services Act), available here.
3 Article 33(1) DSA, i.e., online platforms and online search engines with an average of at least 45 million monthly active users in the EU.
4 Article 56 DSA.
5 European Board for Digital Services, for more see here. 
6 European Commission, Press Release: Commission endorses the integration of the voluntary Code of Practice on Disinformation into the Digital Services Act, available here.}

Press contact
For more information please speak to your local media contact.