
President Trump Orders Section 232 Investigation on Critical Minerals and Derivative Products
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On April 15, 2025, President Trump signed an executive order directing the US Department of Commerce to investigate potential national security risks from imports of processed critical minerals and their derivative products (the "EO"), which could eventually lead to the imposition of tariffs and other trade restrictions. The Department of Commerce Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) will conduct the investigation under Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962, a law that empowers the president to restrict imports of products that are found to threaten to impair national security.1 BIS will likely provide an opportunity for public comments in a forthcoming notice. The EO sets out a compressed timeline for the investigation, instructing BIS to complete the final report and policy recommendations within 180 days of the investigation's initiation (likely in October 2025).
The investigation encompasses processed critical minerals, rare earth elements, uranium, and downstream manufactured products
The EO sets out a wide scope for the investigation, encompassing various processed critical minerals (including rare earth elements and uranium), as well as derivative products and manufactured goods that incorporate minerals. Though lacking in detail, the EO's statement of policy appears to be setting out a far-reaching industrial planning agenda intended to both ensure "ready access to an affordable, resilient, and sustainable supply of processed critical minerals" and create a "resilient and sustainable manufacturing base for [mineral] derivative products" that would provide "a stable demand base for processed critical minerals." According to the EO, mineral processing and the downstream manufacturing "must coexist to ensure economic stability and national security."
To that end, the EO instructs that the Section 232 investigation should examine "processed critical minerals" (including rare earth elements and uranium) and "derivative products." The EO provides the following terms and definitions to establish the product scope of the investigation:
- Processed critical minerals refers to, "critical minerals that have undergone the activities that occur after critical mineral ore is extracted from a mine up through its conversion into a metal, metal powder or a master alloy. These activities specifically occur beginning from the point at which ores are converted into oxide concentrates; separated into oxides; and converted into metals, metal powders, and master alloys."
- Derivative products, includes "all goods that incorporate processed critical minerals as inputs. These goods include semi-finished goods (such as semiconductor wafers, anodes, and cathodes) as well as final products (such as permanent magnets, motors, electric vehicles, batteries, smartphones, microprocessors, radar systems, wind turbines and their components, and advanced optical devices)."
- The critical minerals are those listed on the "Critical Minerals List" published by the United States Geological Survey (USGS) pursuant to section 7002(c) of the Energy Act of 2020. The list includes the following 50 minerals: Aluminum, antimony, arsenic, barite, beryllium, bismuth, cerium, cesium, chromium, cobalt, dysprosium, erbium, europium, fluorspar, gadolinium, gallium, germanium, graphite, hafnium, holmium, indium, iridium, lanthanum, lithium, lutetium, magnesium, manganese, neodymium, nickel, niobium, palladium, platinum, praseodymium, rhodium, rubidium, ruthenium, samarium, scandium, tantalum, tellurium, terbium, thulium, tin, titanium, tungsten, vanadium, ytterbium, yttrium, zinc, and zirconium. The Energy Act Critical Minerals List has become a common feature in US mineral development policy and trade policy. It is at the center of President Trump's March 20 executive order on measures to increase American mineral production and forms the minerals list for the reduced 10% tariff rate on Canadian "energy and energy resources" in the Trump administration's Canada tariff. Unlike the executive order on measures to increase American mineral production, the Section 232 EO does not extend the definition to include copper, potash, and gold. For the time being, the Section 232 EO also does not include coal in its definition of critical minerals. In an executive order focusing on coal industry development issued on April 8, President Trump instructed the Department of Energy to consider adding coal to the Energy Act Critical Minerals List.
- Uranium, which the EO defines as a covered "critical mineral." This will be the third Section 232 investigation to examine uranium imports, and the second undertaken under President Trump.
- Rare earth elements, which includes the 17 elements identified by the Department of Energy in the April 2020 publication "Critical Materials Rare Earths Supply Chain" (most of which are on the Energy Act Critical Minerals List). The 17 identified rare earth elements reflect the common definition, and include the lanthanide series (lanthanum, cerium, praseodymium, neodymium, promethium, samarium, europium, gadolinium, terbium, dysprosium, holmium, erbium, thulium, ytterbium, and lutetium) as well as scandium and yttrium.
The EO's expansive scope means the investigation may overlap with several other active Section 232 tariffs and recently initiated investigations, such as the actions on aluminum and semiconductors.
Accelerated timeline for the investigation
The EO establishes an accelerated timeframe for BIS to complete the investigation. The Department of Commerce is directed to provide an interim report by July 14, 2025 (90 days after the date the EO) to the Secretaries of Treasury and Defense, the United States Trade Representative (USTR), the Assistant to the President for Economic Policy, and the Senior Counsellor to the President for Trade and Manufacturing. Those officials will have 15 days to comment back to the Secretary of Commerce. The final report and recommendations are due to the president within 180 days of the date on which BIS formally initiates the investigation (likely putting the final deadline in October 2025). Normally, the law would allow BIS to take up to 270 days to complete a Section 232 investigation.
Potential trade restrictions and other policy options
Upon receiving BIS' report and policy recommendations, the president may then take action to "adjust the imports of an article and its derivatives" or take other non-trade actions as deemed appropriate. The Trump administration will not issue a final decision on what policy actions it will undertake until after the BIS investigation is complete. Though the EO and an accompanying factsheet show the White House is contemplating new tariffs, the EO also references the potential for "other import restrictions;" "safeguards to avoid circumvention;" "policies to incentivize domestic production, processing, and recycling;" and "any additional measures that may be warranted to mitigate United States national security risks, as appropriate, under the President's authority pursuant to the International Emergency Economic Powers Act."
Forthcoming opportunity for public input
As part of the investigation, BIS will gather public comments and may hold hearings, providing opportunities for stakeholders to share input on the investigation. BIS will provide more information about its plans in a future Federal Register notice, including instructions for the public comment process. Participating in the public comment process can help shape the outcome of the investigation and prompt regulators to further clarify actions.
The April 16 initiation notices for the Section 232 investigations of pharmaceuticals and pharmaceutical ingredients and semiconductors and semiconductor manufacturing equipment may be instructive of how BIS would approach the critical minerals investigation. For those two investigations, BIS is providing only 21 days for public comments. The notices also do not mention any prospective public hearings for the investigations (public hearings are discretionary).
During the first Trump administration and the Biden administration, BIS held public hearings for the steel, aluminum, and automotive imports investigations, but did not hold hearings for the later investigations targeting uranium, titanium sponge, vanadium, permanent magnets, and power transformer components. BIS cited either the small sizes of those industries or the COVID-19 lockdowns as justifications for not holding hearings, choosing to circulate surveys to industry participants instead. The new investigation notices do not explain why BIS has not scheduled hearings and do not state whether BIS is planning to issue surveys as a substitute (though BIS may provide more information on these plans in future updates).
The Trump administration's Section 232 tariffs
In recent weeks, the Trump administration has appeared to move toward a two-track tariff strategy, imposing (i) "baseline" and "reciprocal" tariffs on most products from most countries under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA), apparently seeking to negotiate more favorable market access conditions in return for the lifting of the tariffs; and (ii) Section 232 tariffs on imports associated with industries the Trump administration views as strategically important. Unlike most other tariffs President Trump has imposed in the past, the "baseline" and "reciprocal" tariffs and Section 232 tariffs do not stack on top of each other. Instead, products affected by Section 232 tariffs are exempt from the "baseline" and "reciprocal" tariffs. Annex II of the "baseline" and "reciprocal" tariff order already lists many critical minerals as exempt, which is likely intended to preserve space to develop customized tariff plan under Section 232. The White House factsheet announcing the new Section 232 investigation also highlights that "any resulting tariff rate imposed under Section 232 would take the place of the current reciprocal tariff rate, pursuant to President Trump's April 2 order [the "baseline" and "reciprocal" tariffs]."
Since taking office on January 20, President Trump has expanded the Section 232 tariffs on steel and aluminum and revived a Section 232 investigation from his first term to impose tariffs on imports of passenger vehicles, light trucks, and certain automotive parts. The Trump administration has also initiated new Section 232 investigations targeting imports of copper and copper derivative products; timber, lumber, and wood products; pharmaceuticals and pharmaceutical ingredients; and semiconductors and semiconductor manufacturing equipment.
During his first term as president, President Trump offered opportunities for importers to seek exemptions from Section 232 tariffs under certain circumstances. A few countries were also able to negotiate national exemptions. For his second term, the Trump administration has signaled it does not intend to offer similar exemptions again. The new expansion of the steel and aluminum tariffs included the revocation of all national and product specific exemptions granted under the first Trump administration and the Biden administration. That said, President Trump has begun suggesting that he may be considering moving to a more flexible approach. On April 14, he said that he is discussing temporary exclusions from the automotive tariffs with industry executives. Industry groups and concerned members of Congress will likely continue to pressure the Trump administration to be more receptive to such exclusion requests, but the outcome of these efforts is uncertain.
Authors: Ian Saccomanno
Ruth Benbow (Knowledge Manager, London) contributed to the development of this publication.
1 19 U.S.C. §1862; and 15 C.F.R. part 705. More information on BIS' Section 232 activities can be found on the BIS website.
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