On April 2, 2025, President Trump issued the long-anticipated “reciprocal tariff” order, imposing tariffs on most US trade partners. The tariff includes two components: (i) a 10% “baseline” rate on most trade partners, entering into effect on April 5; and (ii) a set of higher, country-specific “reciprocal” rates on 57 trade partners with which the United States has trade deficits, entering into effect on April 9. Products covered by sector-specific Section 232 tariffs, certain energy and mineral products, and imports from Canada and Mexico (at least temporarily) are exempt from the tariffs. The tariffs are based on a national emergency declaration and the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA), the same authority Trump relied on for his previous tariff orders on China, Canada, and Mexico.
Tariff rates and dates of entry into effect
The tariffs will be implemented in two stages in the coming days, as follows:
- An additional 10% “baseline” tariff on all imports from most trade partners, which will enter into effect at 12:01 a.m. EDT on April 5, 2025; and
- “Reciprocal” tariffs, a replacement to the baseline tariff for trade partners with which the United States has large trade deficits, which will apply from 12:01 a.m. EDT on April 9, 2025.
The tariffs apply to goods entered for consumption or withdrawn from a warehouse for consumption on or after the effective date unless those goods were loaded onto a vessel and in transit on the final mode of transit before the effective date. In such cases, the additional tariffs will not apply.1
The economy-specific rates for the April 9 “reciprocal” tariffs are provided in Annex I of the order. For the covered trade partners, the reciprocal tariff rate will replace the 10% baseline rate on April 9 (i.e., the two tariffs are not additive). The reciprocal tariffs apply to most economies with which the United States has large bilateral goods trade deficits (excluding Canada and Mexico), as well as the European Union (EU). The reciprocal tariff rates are large, including 46% on Vietnam, 37% on Thailand, 34% on China (including Hong Kong and Macau), 26% on South Korea (a free trade agreement partner), 24% on Japan, and 20% on the EU.2
Both the baseline tariff and the reciprocal tariff only apply to Column 1 of the Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the United States (HTSUS), for both general (Most Favored Nation (MFN)) and special rates. As a result, articles imported from trading partners that are subject to the United States’ non-MFN rates in Column 2 of the HTSUS are not affected by the tariff. Imports from Russia, Belarus, Cuba, and North Korea are subject to Column 2.
The tariffs are in addition to “any other duties, fees, taxes, exactions, or charges applicable,” including those mandated by antidumping and/or countervailing duty orders and Section 301 actions. For example, on April 9 Chinese goods will be subject to the 34% country-specific reciprocal tariff, the current 20% IEEPA tariff, as well as any applicable antidumping and/or countervailing duties and Section 301 duties.
The order also states that Trump may “increase the tariff if trading partners retaliate or decrease the tariffs if trading partners take significant steps to remedy non-reciprocal trade arrangements and align with the United States on economic and national security matters.”
Product exclusions
Some products will be excluded from the tariffs. These include:
- Steel and aluminum articles and autos and auto parts already subject to Section 232 tariffs;
- Copper, pharmaceuticals, semiconductors, and lumber articles (to which Section 232 tariffs will likely be applied in the near future);
- Other articles that may become subject to future Section 232 tariffs in the future;
- Gold and silver bullion;
- Energy and certain critical minerals that are not available in the United States; and
- Articles subject to 50 U.S.C. 1702(b).3
The order includes a partial list of the excluded products at the HTSUS 8-digit level in Annex II.4 The list contains various energy products, copper articles, semiconductors and components, wood and wood articles, pharmaceuticals, nonmonetary gold and silver bullion, critical minerals, and printed media. Products listed in Annex II are automatically excluded from the tariffs. Other products indicated as excluded in the order, including certain steel, aluminum, and automotive products, are not listed in Annex II. Instead, these exclusions are based on the composition of the existing HTSUS Chapter 99 codes for the steel, aluminum, and automotive Section 232 tariffs.
Temporary exemption for goods from Canada and Mexico
For now, Canada and Mexico are excluded from the tariffs. Imports from these two countries will remain subject to the IEEPA tariffs implemented in early March, with the exemption for goods that qualify as originating under the United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA) continuing to apply. However, if the current IEEPA tariffs on Canada and Mexico are terminated or suspended, a new tariff of 12% on goods that do not qualify as originating under the USMCA would enter into effect automatically. Exemptions from this 12% tariff would include articles that are entered free of duty under USMCA-, the standard product exclusions provided in the reciprocal tariff order, and articles eligible for duty-free treatment under USMCA that are parts or components of items that will be substantially finished in the United States. Under the current IEEPA tariffs on Canada and Mexico, energy and energy resources from Canada and potash-related imports from both countries are subject to a 10% tariff, instead of a complete exemption like that in the replacement tariff.
Tariff exclusion for US origin content
The tariffs will also exclude the value of US-origin content in an imported article, if the imported article is composed of at least 20% US originating components by value. The order defines “US content” as “the value of an article attributable to the components produced entirely, or substantially transformed in, the United States.” The order authorizes US Customs and Border Protection (CBP) to prepare new information and documentation systems to validate US content claims.
Future suspension of customs de minimis entry
Currently, customs de minimis entry, which allows shipments valued under $800 to enter the US market duty-free with fewer informational requirements, will remain available. This will continue until the Secretary of Commerce notifies the president that adequate systems are in place to efficiently process and collect the applicable duty revenue for such articles. Once this notification is given, use of de minimis entry will be prohibited.
De minimis entry prohibition for imports from China
Alongside the tariff order, Trump issued an order specifically prohibiting de minimis entry for imports from China and Hong Kong. Starting May 2, 2025, goods originating in China and Hong Kong entering the United States (other than through the postal service), which would ordinarily enter under de minimis treatment, must instead be entered by a qualified party under a different entry type in the Automated Commercial Environment (ACE). All applicable duties, including the 20% IEEPA tariff for goods from China, must be paid according to the relevant entry and payment procedures. Under this system, all de minimis eligible goods (that enter the United States other than through the postal service) will be subject to the same duties as other goods from China. The order also establishes a new tariff rate and payment system for postal entries of goods originating in China and Hong Kong. De minimis eligible goods from China entering via the postal system will be subject to a 30% ad valorem duty or an additional $25 specific duty per postal item, increasing to $50 per package on June 1, 2025. The carrier is allowed to elect whether to pay the ad valorem duty or the specific duty. Carriers transporting postal goods are required to have an international carrier bond sufficient to cover the duties to ensure payment.
Opportunity for negotiation
The April 2 action results from a plan that had called for the creation of “reciprocal tariffs” on all US trade partners. The Trump administration appears to have significantly simplified the plan since the proposal was first introduced. Originally, on February 13, 2025, Trump issued a memorandum instructing the executive branch to begin a process to design new “reciprocal tariffs” on US trade partners and which would focus on inquiries into specific trade partners’ barriers and then develop proposals for imposing a “reciprocal tariff” for each trading partner. Despite abandoning the plan for country and product-specific tariffs, the Trump administration is still offering to negotiate over potential reductions to the imposed tariffs. Despite this offer, trading partners, such as the EU and UK, that tried to negotiate settlements in advance of the tariff order did not obtain exemptions or reduced tariff rates at introduction.
The International Emergency Economic Powers Act
Trump is invoking IEEPA as the legal foundation for his tariff order, declaring there is “a national emergency arising from conditions reflected in large and persistent annual US goods trade deficits.” Historically, no US president has utilized IEEPA to impose tariffs. However, policy advisors close to Trump have argued the law’s broad authorities enable the president to rapidly implement tariffs with less need for investigations or oversight. With few procedural limits around the use of IEEPA, the president can escalate conflicts suddenly, as in this case.
The scope of the authority spelled out in IEEPA is broad, allowing the president to “regulate […] any […] importation […] of, or dealing in, […] or transactions involving, any property in which any foreign country or a national thereof has any interest by any person, or with respect to any property, subject to the jurisdiction of the United States” in response to national emergencies. IEEPA does not require investigations or reports before implementing trade restrictions, unlike other laws that empower the president to impose trade restrictions, such as Section 301, Section 232, and Section 201. To use IEEPA, the president declares a national emergency under the National Emergencies Act (NEA) and then exercises discretionary authority under IEEPA. A national emergency can be based on a threat to the US national security, foreign policy, or the economy. Presidents have typically used the law to impose sanctions on US adversaries. That said, the scope and breadth of such emergencies has evolved over time to cover more expansive issues.
Authors: Jessica Lynd, Allison Kepkay, Samuel Scoles, Ian Saccomanno
Ruth Benbow (Knowledge Manager, London) contributed to the development of this publication.
We provide below a list of partners and senior attorneys within the Global International Trade Practice of White & Case. Please contact any of them with questions about this report or other trade issues.
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Washington, DC: David Bond (Partner); Ryan Brady (Partner); Cristina Brayton-Lewis (Partner); Jay Campbell (Partner); Nicole Erb (Partner); Farhad Jalinous (Partner); David Lim (Partner); Gregory Spak (Partner)
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Mexico: Francisco de Rosenzweig (Partner); Carlos Vejar (Local Partner)
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Brussels: James Killick (Partner); Sara Nordin (Partner)
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Geneva: Jasper Wauters (Partner); Charles Julien (Partner)
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London: Chris Thomas (Counsel); Ed Pearson (Senior Associate)
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Paris: Orion Berg (Partner)
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Tokyo: William Moran (Partner)
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Dubai: Marcus Sohlberg (Counsel)
1 In guidance to importers, CBP stated that it will stop accepting filings for the goods in transit exception to the 10% tariff on May 27.
2 According to a note published by the Office of the United States Trade Representative (USTR), “Reciprocal Tariff Calculations,” the Trump administration calculated the reciprocal tariffs by dividing the United States’s trade deficit with a given trade partner by the United States’ total imports from that trade partner, then divided the result by two.
3 50 U.S.C. § 1702(b) prohibits IEEPA-based actions (such as these tariffs) from regulating or prohibiting, directly or indirectly, (1) personal communications, (2) donated articles, (3) informational materials, and (4) transactions ordinarily incident to travel. See FAQ 1 at “International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) Frequently Asked Questions” on the CBP website for a partial list of products that may be considered “informational materials” under previous IEEPA-based tariffs.
4 The note in Annex II stating the products that “are listed in this Annex are covered by the action” appears to be a typo. The HTSUS Chapter 99 amendments identify the products included in Annex II as the products to which the tariffs shall not apply.
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