The Empire District Electric Company ("EDE"), FERC Docket No. RC13-2-000 (November 30, 2012)
Reliability Standard: TOP-002-2a
Requirement: 11
Region: SPP
Issue: EDE self-reported that it was it was no longer performing current and next-day Bulk Electric System studies in compliance with the R11 standard. Earlier, EDE had depended on the Southwest Power Pool Reliability Coordinator (SPP RC) to carry out the current and next-day study; however SPP RC informed EDE that these studies would no longer be performed on EDE's behalf, even though SPP RC would continue to perform system current and next-day studies.
Finding: SPP found the issue posed a minimal risk to the reliability of the BPS, since the SPP RC continued to perform system current and next-day studies, which were available to EDE even though they were not completed on EDE's behalf. System operators continued to establish System Operating Limits (SOLs) utilizing the contingency analysis provided by the SPP RC studies and EDE produced evidence that it communicated with the SPP RC regarding the identification of SOLs, as well as reviewed the studies on a daily basis.
Find, Fix and Track Entity, Docket No. RC11-6 (September 30, 2011)
Reliability Standard: TOP-002-2a
Requirement: R3
Region: SPP
Issue: FFT Entity self-reported that on one occasion an entity (acting on its own behalf and on behalf of FFT Entity) attempted to email its next-day load forecasts to its BA and TO, but the email transmittal did not go through.
Finding: SPP found that this issue constituted only a minimal actual risk to BPS reliability. When the other entity discovered the next day that the email had not gone through, it immediately resent the load forecast. In addition, the other entity has a telemetering link with its BA and TO, which allows for real-time observations of FFT Entity’s electric system, and the BA and TO did not follow-up concerning the status of the load forecast. The failed email also did not contain reports for current-day or seasonal operations.
Find, Fix and Track Entity, Docket No. RC11-6 (September 30, 2011)
Reliability Standard: TOP-002-2a
Requirement: R3
Region: SPP
Issue: FFT Entity self-reported that on one occasion its operations shift supervisor attempted to email its next-day generation availability report and next-day load forecasts to its BA and TO, but the email transmittal did not go through.
Finding: SPP found that this issue constituted only a minimal actual risk to BPS reliability. When the operations shift supervisor discovered the next day that the email had not gone through, he immediately resent the report and forecasts. In addition, FFT Entity has a telemetering link with its BA and TO, which allows for real-time observations of FFT Entity’s electric system, and the BA and TO did not follow-up concerning the status of the missing items. The failed email also did not contain reports for current-day or seasonal operations.
Find, Fix and Track Entity, Docket No. RC11-6 (September 30, 2011)
Reliability Standard: TOP-002-2a
Requirement: R14
Region: NPCC
Issue: Following a self-report, NPCC determined FFT Entity failed to properly notify its BA/TOP of a reduction in capabilities stemming from poor fuel conditions.
Finding: NPCC found that this issue constituted only a minimal risk to bulk power system reliability because the violation only concerned 20 MW out of the BA’s approx. 28,000 MW, only lasted 11 hours total over three occurrences on the same day, and the FFT Entity's output was consistent with normal variability for that type of unit.
PowerSmith Cogeneration Project, LP, FERC Docket No. RC12-11 (April 30, 2012)
Reliability Standard: TOP-002-2a
Requirement: R18
Region: SPP
Issue: PowerSmith Cogeneration Project, LP (Powersmith), as a GO, self-reported that it did not use uniform line identifiers for transmission facilities of an interconnected network as it had not identified its transmission line to the Oklahoma Gas & Electric Co.’s (OG&E) Dayton substation in a manner that was uniform with the name that OG&E assigned to the line.
Finding: SPP found that this issue constituted only a minimal risk to the BPS. The line from Powersmith to OG&E is only 455 feet long and is Powersmith’s only interconnection with OG&E, thereby making it improbable that there would be a miscommunication regarding the interconnection.
