Duke Energy Carolinas (Duke), FERC Docket No. RC13-5-000 (January 31, 2013)
Reliability Standard: MOD-030-2
Requirement: 2
Region: SERC
Issue: Duke, as a TOP, self-reported a violation of R2 of MOD-030-2 to SERC on September 29, 2011, in that it did not update the Total Flowgate Capability (TFC) in seven days after the TO notified Duke of a Rating change that would affect the TFC of a Flowgate utilized in the Available Flowgate Capability (AFC) process. SERC confirmed that Duke, as a TO, changed a Rating on May 31, 2011 as a result of replacing a 230kV/100kV transformer; Duke as a TOP received notification on the same day but did not update the TFC in seven days as mandated by MOD-030-2 R 2.5.1. On June 15, 2011, Duke discovered that it had not updated the Rating change and self-reported, mitigated the issue, and notified adjacent TSPs on that day. Upon review, Duke found no other instances of violation.
Finding: SERC found that the issue posed a minimal risk to the reliability of the bulk power system because the scheduled flows did not go over 73% of the revised Facility Rating, the real-time reliability assessments, despite the Rating change's effect on the transfer capability, used the correct Rating and did not go over the revised Rating or produced any reliability issues, and the Rating change was recorded in the real-time Energy Management System on the day of TOP's notification despite the failure to update the Rating Change for calculating AFC/TFC under seven days.
Duke Energy Carolinas (Duke), Docket No. RC13-7-000 (March 27, 2013)
Reliability Standard: MOD-030-2
Requirement: 5
Region: SERC
Issue: Duke submitted a self-report in April 2012 alerting SERC to a compliance issue with MOD-030-2. Duke reported that it had not included certain expected outage data in its Available Flowgate Capability (AFC) calculation, which was subsequently found to be the result of a coding error in the program used to upload the data. The day Duke became aware of the problem, it was fixed.
Finding: The issue was deemed to pose minimal risk to BPS reliability and not serious or substantial risk. During the relevant time period, Duke had no generation or transmission outages that would have created a significant change to the AFC calculation or contributed to a violation of the System Operating Limit or Interconnection Reliability Operating Limit.
Entergy, Docket No. RC13-9, May 30, 2013
Reliability Standard: MOD-030-2
Requirement: 2
Region: SERC
Issue: Entergy, as a TOP, self-reported to SERC that it had an issue with MOD-030-2 R2 after discovering that it had not incorporated a change to the Total Flowgate Capability (TFC) calculation within seven days of notification of such change by the TO that would affect the TFC of a Flowgate used in the Available Flowgate Capability (AFC) process. In particular, on one instance, Entergy did not acknowledge receipt of a derate notification by the TO for17 days, and did not incorporate the change to the TFC model until 18 calendar days after the notification.
Finding: SERC determined that the issue posed a minimal risk to the BPS because the derate at issue was only 2 MW (0.7%, of the Flowgate’s capacity), and the resulting TFC has not been approached during operation. Additionally, in the event that the Rating had been exceeded, the derate would not have changed any of the steps that Entergy would have taken.
South Carolina Electric & Gas Company (SCE&G), Docket No. RC12-14 (July 30, 2012)
Reliability Standard: MOD-030-2
Requirement: 1
Region: SERC
Issue: SCE&G found that a previously filed document required by Transmission Service Providers and associated with calculating Available Transfer Capacity (ATC) and/or Available Flowgate Capability (AFC), the Available Transfer Capability Implementation Document (ATCID), did not contain all information as required by MOD-030. SCG&E submitted a July 2011 self-report to SERC of the issue. In particular, after conducting a compliance review of its ATCID after implementing its Flowgate Methodology, SCE&G found that the model it used was correct but the documentation was lacking in that it did not show how it mapped the source identification and mapping details for one independent power producer on its system. SCE&G updated the document to include all required items.
Finding: The issue was deemed by SERC to pose minimal risk to BPS reliability because the ATCID was revised to include the required information, and the models connected with this ATCID were shown to be complete.
